The report on Charleston’s June 18, 2007, Sofa Super Store fire was released last week, containing what we already suspected: that the fuel load and fire behavior outperformed the tactics, code requirements/enforcement, staffing, decision making, command and control, human resource management practices, training, and equipment employed by the Charleston (SC) Fire Department. The larger question is, do we really learn from the lessons of others? If you look at the behavior of city mayors, the answer has to be “No; no, sadly, we don’t.” Among mayors, Charleston’s Mr. Joe Riley is legendary: To find that a mayor of his caliber had little to no connection to his fire service and its day-to-day operations and capabilities should shock us all.
We have all read and reread the list of critical factors that were, for a multitude of reasons, missed or misinterpreted by the commanding officers and responding companies. The report identifies the direct detrimental effects of running substandard-staffed crews on decision making, where company officers become the number-two member advancing the line and do not focus on observing the conditions for progress, changes, and warning signs. The report outlines where a lack of staffing dictated the replacement of tactical synergy with incremental tactical discord.
The report confirmed what we collectively have been saying for the past 30 yearsthat effective firefighting requires the proper number of well-trained and properly equipped firefighters assembled in a reasonable time after receipt of alarm to conduct effective fireground operations. Having sufficient numbers of trained, equipped firefighters assembled in a reasonable time conducting synchronized tactical operations is the only way to minimize the risks of interior structural firefighting. The report states the unequivocal need for better ordinances and stronger codes and diligent enforcement.
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